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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCES R. PURDIE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY of the University of 
Utah, CLAUDE IV. GRANT, JOSEPH C. 
BENTLEY, ROBERT E. FINLEY, ADELAIDE 
FUHRIMAN, REED ~1. MERRILL, RALPH E. 
PACKARD, Jfu~ES P. PAPPAS, MICHAEL 
J. PATTON, and JOHN DOES I through 
VII, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 15209 
BRIEF OF Al'liCI CURIAE UTAH STATE COALITIO'\J OF 
SENIO CITIZENS AND THE NATIONAL RETIRED TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION - AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RETIRED PERSONS. 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter plaintiff) 
initiated this action for declaratory and injunctive 
relief alleging that defendants-respondants (hereafter 
defendants) invidiously discriminated against her on 
the basis of her age and denied her free and equal 
access to the public school system of the State of Utah 
by denying her admission to a graduate study program 
at the University of Utah. 
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II 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court below dismissed plaintiff's 
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action, 
ruling that the use of age as a criterion for 
evaluation of applicants violates no statutory or 
constitutional provision. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Amici support plaintiff's request for 
relief in the form of a reversal of the judgment 
and order of dismissal, a determination that 
discrimination on the basis of age for admission to 
a state educational institution is contrary to 
various statutory and constitutional provisions as 
a matter of law, and an order remanding this matter 
with instructions for a full trial and hearing. 
IV 
STATENENT OF FACTS 
Amici agree with plaintiff's statement of 
the facts of the case. 
-2-
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v 
HJTEREST OF l\J'1ICI 
This brief amici curiae has been filed by 
Stipulation of the parties and Order of the court 
dated September 6, 1977. 
The Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens 
is a private nonprofit advocacy organization organ-
ized in 1975 to identify senior citizen concerns 
and advocate policy change to meet those concerns. 
The National Retired Teachers Association and the 
American Association of Retired Persons are affiliated 
and jointly administered nonprofit corporations having 
a combined membership of over 10,000,000 peo?le. 
The above organizations support the propositio1 
that age-based discrimination against older persons 
is based on stereotyped notions of the capabilities 
of older persons that are untrue. Therefore the 
amici believe that age-based discrimination in the 
access to public education is irrational and in 
violation of the equal protection and due process 
clauses of the Constitutions of Utah and of the 
United States. 
-3-
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VI 
ARGUHE:JT 
POINT I 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that educational opportunities, 
if offered by a state, be made available free of 
discriminatory criteria having no rational relation-
ship to the state's legiti~ate educational goals. 
The plaintiff's complaint, after alleging 
that she was qualified for admission to the defendants' 
institution for post-graduate study and that she was 
rejected "for the sole reason" of her age, alleges 
that the defendants: 
.at all times pertinent to this action, 
and now, maintain a policy of discrimination 
against applicants for ad~issions to the 
post-graduate degre6 prog=a~s of the Depart-
ment of Educational ?s-_-~;'•clcgy on the basis 
of age; giving pr~~erer ;~~ admissions to 
the Department to young~r Jersons over older 
persons. 
(R. 3) 
Based upon that allegation, which is true for present 
purposes, the lower court held: 
.. that the use of age as a criterion for 
evaluation of applicants to educational 
programs is not in violation of the equal 
protection guarantees of the United States 
Constitution. .and is a reasonable 
practice in light of the limited resources 
available for educating persons in the 
field of educational psychology at the 
University of Utah; .. 
(R. 91) 
-4-
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In other words, according to the holding of the 
lower court, the age-based admissions policy is so 
remote from a constitutional problem that adversarial 
factual investigation beyond the complaint is unnec-
essary; for reasons to follow, it will be shown that 
the instant case does not lend itself to such a 
facile disposition. 
The rational basis test, distilled to its essence, 
. requires only that the State's system be shown 
to bear some rational relationship to legitimate 
state purposes •. San Antonio Independent School 
District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S.l, at 40 (1973). Never-
theless, as the court in Bradley v. Vance, No. 76-0085 
(D.D.C. 1977) (a copy attached hereto), observed, 
in a case involving age-based classifications affecting 
employment of federal civil servants: the 
application of the 'rational basis standard' does not 
require, though, judicial abdication. • II Id. 
p. 3. As the following cases illustrate, the latitude 
accorded states, in structuring educational programs, 
does not insulate them from the constitutional require-
ment that persons situated equally must be treated 
equally. 
-5-
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College rules requiring that certain classes 
of students live on campus have been the source 
of equal protection claims, with mixed results 
depending upon the existence or nonexistence of a 
reasonable relationship to legitimate educational 
goals. In Mollere v. Southeastern Louisiana College, 
304 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. La. 1969), a college required 
all girls under 21 to live in dormitories, unless 
exceptions were granted, for the sole and avowed 
purpose of paying off bond issues used to finance 
the dormitories. In holding that the policy violated 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the court stated: 
.This is the type of irrational discrim-
ination impermissible under the Fourteenth 
Amendment ... Absent the special educational 
considerations previously mentioned the sup-
port of the housing system is an obligation 
which should fall on all students equally 
just as does, for example, tuition .... To 
select a group less-than-all, to fulfill an 
obligation which should fall equally on all, 
is a violation of equal protection no matter 
how the group is selected. 
304 F. Supp. at 828. 1 
I While Mollere dealt with a sex-based class-
ification, that fact did not figure in the decision; 
even if it did, the rational basis test was, at the 
time, still applicable to sex-based classifications. 
Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 u.s. 464 (1948). While the 
matter is still not free from doubt, it appears 
that, following Craig v. Boren, ____ U.S. ____ , 97 
S. Ct. 451 (1976), sex-based classifications are 
subjected to closer scrutiny by the court than is 
-6-
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Likewise, in Cooper v. Nix, 343 F. Supp. 1101 (W.o. 
La. 1972), the court invalidated, as unrelated to 
any legitimate educational goal, a school policy 
requiring all students to live on campus and exempting 
students 23 years of age or older. The Court held 
that the classification embodied in the exemption 
of students 23 years of age or over failed to measure 
up to the rational basis criterion. 2 
true under the traditional rational basis test. Prior 
to Craig v. Boren, the rational basis test seems to 
have been the vehicle for deciding cases involving 
sex-based classifications. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 
419 U.S. 498 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 
(1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Reed 
v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); see Baltic Independent 
School District v. South Dakota High School Activities 
Assn., 362 F. Supp. 780 (D. S.D. 1973), and Cooper v. 
Nix, 343 F. Supp.-1101 (W.O. La. 1972), which observed 
that Reed v. Reed, supra, was predicated upon the 
rational basis test~llowing Reed v. Reed, the 
court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), 
by virtue of a plurality and s1ngle justice concurring 
opinion, appeared to go beyond the rational basis 
test, but the court subsequently, in Kahn v. Shevin, 
supra, returned to the more traditional standard. 
2 Cooper v. Nix was reversed, in part, on ground~ 
unrelated to the above discussion and remanded with 
directions to the lower court to recast the injunctive 
relief granted. Cooper v. Nix, 496 F. 2d 1285 
(5th Cir. 1974). 
-7-
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The necessity of a rational correlation 
between legitimate educational objectives and 
classifications embodied in school policy was 
emphasized in three other decisions involving 
campus residency requirements which arrived at 
different results because of different evidence. 
In Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota, 
507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974), Poynter v. Drevdahl, 
359 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D. Mich. 1972), and Pratz v. 
Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872 
(W.D. La. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 401 U.S. 
1004 (1971), abundant and persuasive evidence was 
produced by the respective institutions that dormi-
tory living had educational advantages and that 
those advantages were substantially diminished in 
the case of older students, e.g., returning 
veterans and married students living without their 
spouses. Based upon that proof, a rational con-
nection was ascertained between the classification 
exempting older students from dormitory living and 
the legitimate educational objectives of the schools; 
however, as pointed out by the court in Prostrollo 
v. University of South Dakota, supra, the result 
was based upon that proof, and perhaps would have 
-8-
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been different if the evidence showed that the sole 
purpose of the requirement was to pay for bonds 
issued to build the dormitories, citing Mollere v. 
Southeastern Louisiana College, supra, 507 F. 2d 
at 780. 
The validity of a classification pursuant to 
which the District of Columbia made funds available 
for the extra-territorial education of handicapped 
children and wards of D.C. courts in foster homes 
outside the district, but for no other students, 
despite an opportunity for integrated education 
offered by a Maryland school system, occupied the 
court in Bullock v. Washington, 468 F. 2d 1096 
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Finding that the D.C. school 
system offered no educational opportunties for 
handicapped children and that children in foster 
homes outside the district possessed unique charac-
teristics, logically distinguishing them from 
students in general, the court upheld the class-
ification. However, it did emphasize that: 
It is generally true, of course, that although 
the District is not obligated to provide any 
students with an extra-territorial education, 
it must do so for all equally if it choooses 
to do so for any. . . . 468 F.2d at 1106. 
-9-
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Applying the same principle, the court in Baltic 
Independent School District v. South Dakota High 
School Activities Assn., 362 F. Supp. 780 (D. S.D. 
1973), invalidated a policy which divided South 
Dakota high schools into two classes, depending upon 
population, for the purpose of debate competition; the 
effect of the policy was to make national competition 
available to two teams from the larger schools and 
only one team from the smaller schools. Finding that 
the classification penalized students in the smaller 
schools, with no corresponding educational justification, 
the court stated: .In order to comply with equal 
protection requirements, there must be equality of 
opportunity among people with similar qualifications. 
3 362 F. Supp. at 785. A final illustrative case is 
Wittkamper v. Harvey, 188 F. Supp. 715 (M.D. Ga. 1960), 
which considered the validity under the equal protection 
clause of a policy of permitting the transfer of county 
students to a city school system but excluding Mennonite 
students for vague reasons related to peace and order. 
In holding that the practice violated the Mennoite 
students' rights under the equal protection clause, the 
court stated: 
3 The court also emphasized that eligibility 
for scholarships can be affected by a student's 
overall scholastic record, which could include partic-
ipation in national debate competition. That point is 
r~levant in the present case because, as will be shown 
below, there is a demonstrable relationship between the 
possession of a graduate degree and an individual's 
earning ability. 
-10-
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... [W]hen the City Board decides to accept 
some students [from the county system] and 
proceeds to accept some such students, the 
City Board is then obligated under the law 
to afford equal protection to all such students 
desiring to transfer from the County to the 
City school system. Such obligation exists 
even though the County students have no right 
to attend City schools, and even though trans-
fer to the City system 'is merely a privilege 
granted or withheld by [the City Board] at 
its pleasure.' .This is not to say, of 
course, that the City Board may not impose 
reasonable standards to be met before a trans-
fer student will be accepted. Certainly the 
City Board may require superior academic and 
conduct records if it desires to do so. And 
surely the City Board may limit the number of 
transfer students it will accept. But the 
City Board may not arbitrarily refuse to admit 
a transfer student for 'any reason at all, 
or for no reason' if it is admitting other 
transfer students. Although the City Board 
has a discretion, it is a legal discretion 
which must be exercised in accordance with 
theConstitution's requirement that all persons 
be accorded equal protection. 188 F. Supp. 
at 720-721. 
The foregoing decisions illustrate that all 
persons within the ambit of an educational program 
are guaranteed by the equal protection clause equal 
opportunities to participate in the program, whether 
the program is optional or compulsory, i.e., whether 
it is denominated a right or privilege. The rule is 
necessarily as applicable to a university offering 
post~raduate education as to a school district 
gratuitously offering education programs to students 
beyond the territorial sphere of its responsibility. 
-11-
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While classifications creating exceptions or 
special treatment are permissible under certain 
circumstances, they must, under the Constitution, 
be justified by a demonstrable relationship between 
the classification and legitimate educational 
objectives. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff has 
alleged that she is qualified in all respects for 
admission to the defendants' post-graduate program, 
that she was rejected solely because of her age, 
and that the defendants maintain a policy of utilizing 
age as a selection criterion. The lower court's 
order of dismissal precluded any evidentiary hearing 
focused upon the particulars of that policy, the 
age ranges which are utilized, the mechanics of the 
selection process, and, most importantly, the 
existence or non-existence of a legitimate educational 
justification for the policy. It is submitted that 
the order is thus mainifestly erroneous and must be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
The Fqual Protection Clause and the Due Process 
of the Fourteenth Amendment forbid policies and 
-12-
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practices which vest in individuals the power to make 
arbitrary judgments, in granting or withholding ot 
public benefits or privileges, unguided by ascertainabl 
standards. 
The sketchy record before the court reveals 
that in the academic year of 1975 the plaintiff was 
51 years old, that her application was rejected 
because of her age, and that the lower court found 
no constitutional infirmity " ... in light of the 
limited resources available for educating persons 
in the field of educational psychology. 
Because of the lower court's summary disposition of 
the case, we are not informed: 1) who made the 
de~ision to reject the plaintiff's application; 
2) at what level the decision was reached; 3) the 
number of persons who participated in the decision 
and their responsibilities; 4) whether the age of 
51, or some earlier age, is the cut-off point; 
5) whether the age-based decision is influenced by 
the extent to which an applicant equals or exceeds 
normal admissions requirements; 6) the resources 
actually available to the Department of Educational 
Psychology; 7) the qualificiations and age~ of 
successful applicants for the 1975 academic year; 
-13-
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or 8) whether any policies or regulations 
governing admissions decisions have ever been 
duly promulgated. The list could go on, 
but the foregoing suffices to illustrate the point 
that, within the factual background before this 
court, the denial of the plaintiff's application 
could have been the result of an ad hoc, arbitrary 
judgment by a single individual applying subjective 
standards known to, and comprehended only by, himself. 
In Wittkamper v. Harvey, supra, 188 F. Supp. 
715 (M.D. Ga. 1960), a case discussed earlier, the 
court invalidated a classification which excluded 
Mennonite children from educational opportunities 
under a reciprocal agreement between two school boards 
and held, in part: 
. But the City Board may not arbitrarily 
refuse to admit a transfer student for 'any 
reason at all, or for no reason' if it is 
admitting other transfer students ... 188 
F. Supp. at 721. 4 
4 Wittkamper v. Harvey, though dealing 
with a classification based upon religion, did not 
discuss the equal protection lssue with reference 
to the First Amendment's guarantee of religious 
freedom; rather, the court applied the traditional 
rational basis equal protection analysis. Compare 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
-14-
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The constitutional inhibition against the practice 
of bestowing or withholding benefits through 
arbitrary judgment with no definable standards is 
illustrated in other contexts. For example, while 
no person has a constitutional right to purvey liquor, 
and the receipt of a liquor license is merely a 
privilege, it is a violation of equal protection of 
the laws if everyone similarly situated is not treated 
equally, free from arbitrary decisions granting or 
withhnlding a license. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F. 2d 
605 (5th Cir. 1964); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control 
Comm., 160 F. 2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947). Again, in Holmes 
v. New York Housing Authority, 398 F. 2d 262 (2nd Cir. 
1968) , the court invalidated the New York Housing 
Authority's policy of selecting, with no ascertainable 
standards, public housing tenants from among applicants 
far exceeding in number the available units. The court 
stated: 
.It hardly need be said that the exist-
ence of an absolute and uncontrolled discretion 
in an agency of government vested with the 
administration of a vast program, such as 
public housing, would be an intolerable invita-
tion to abuse. 398 F. 2d at 265. 
In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), the 
court, in holding that a student was entitled to a 
pre-suspension hearing, observed that " .The Clause 
-15-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
requires at least these rudimentary precautions 
against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct 
and arbitrary exclusion from school." 419 U.S. 
at 481. While Goss v. Lopez involved a procedural 
due process claim, as did Holmes v. New York 
Housing Authority, supra, it would seem that the 
due process clause and the equal protection 
clause have been, and properly so, treated inter-
changeably by the courts when evaluating the legal 
effect of arbitrary action. The effect of arbitrary 
decision-making, with no articulated standards, is 
both to deprive an excluded individual of the equal 
protection of the laws and to deprive him of the 
5 
opportunity for a meaningful hearing. 
Even if it be assumed that some form of age 
requirement is permissible under the equal protection 
clause, its validity would necessarily rest upon 
a demonstrable relationship to the University of 
Utah's proper educational objectives. Based upon 
5 While the plaintiff's complaint speaks of 
equal protection, the lower court's order held that 
the programs in question violated neither the equal 
protection guarantees of the United States Constitution 
nor any other statutory or constitutional prohibition. 
It is submitted that a due process claim is fairly 
encompassed within the allegations of the complaint. 
For examples of the interchangeability of equal pro-
tection concepts and due process concepts, compare 
-16-
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the record now before this court, it is impossible 
even to guess what those ends could be, but even 
if that problem were overcome, it is still not 
possible to determine whether the policy sustained 
by the lower court is constitutional. The reason, 
of course, is that the vague and broad power to use 
"age as a criterion" is equivalent to the limitless 
power to make subjective judgments and then assign 
age as a reason for turning away an otherwise 
qualified individual. If an official responsible 
for the admissions decision dislikes an applicant 
for reasons known only to himself, be that applicant 
30, 35, 40, or 45 years of age, the application can 
be denied because of age. Moreover, in the absence 
of standards that identify the particular disqualifyir 
age or ages, there is no way to measure the policy 
under the equal protection clause. If the justificat] 
for applying an age-based criterion were, e.g., to 
avoid placing senile individuals in the graduate 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528 (1973), and Carrington v. Rash, 380 
U.S. 89 (1965), with Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 
441 (1973), United States Department of Agriculture 
v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), and Stanley v. Illinoi~ 
405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
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program, an analysis would still be necessitated 
to determine if there is a reasonable correlation 
between the selected age and the incidence of 
senility. The record discloses no standards, 
policies, or regulations concerning age or any 
other criteria for making admissions decisions. 
Defendants' brief (at 14-15) cites Beard v. Board 
of Education North Summit School District, et al., 
81 Utah 51, 16 P. 2d 900 (1932), for the proposition 
there is a presumption of reasonableness attached 
to the acts of school administrators. Defendants 
ignore the portion of the quotation emphasized 
by themselves linking the presumption discussed to 
"a rule or regulation duly made." Beard v. Board 
of Education, supra, at 903. Defendants have 
promulgated no rules or regulations concerning 
admissions decisions. In short, the unfettered 
discretion that the decision of the lower court 
vests in the defendants clearly does not square 
with either the equal protection clause or the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
ARGW1ENT 
POINT III 
No constitutionally sufficient justification 
is conceivable for the age based class1fication ln 
lSSUe. 
-18-
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The plaintiff is in her middle ages and 
there is no suggestion in the record that she is 
intellectually disqualified from the defendants' 
post-graudate program. Indeed, the stipulated facts 
are that her credentials, educational background, 
experience, and academic record "exceeded the normal 
admissions requirements." (R.3) Aside from the 
facts of the instant case, it is now free from 
doubt that age, in and of itself, is no indicator of 
f . 1 b'l' 
6 learning and unctlona a l lty. 
6 See Green, Age, Intelligence and Learning, 
Industrial Gerontology,Winter 1972 (the Natlonal 
Council on the Aging, Inc.), which reaches the 
following conclusion, based upon an evaluation 
of the relationship between advancing age and 
declining learning ability: 
Does I.Q. decline? Probably yes, sooner 
or later, but much later than people had thought. 
When does it become critical to performance? 
For many people not until ages such as the 70's, 
80's or even 90's. In other words, we seem to 
be over-endowed for most tasks we need to carry 
out. We can absorb a lot of physical deterioration, 
especially in the brain, because these losses do 
not necessarily reduce our normal functioning 
range. In fact, there is reason to believe that 
if measurable decline appears before age 60, then 
some disease of or substantial injury to the central 
nervous system must have been incurred. 
Fortunately, the organs of the body are overbuilt 
in the sense that they can perform more than is 
ordinarily demanded, at least until age 65 in 
almost everyone, and even after that in most people. 
-19-
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In recent years many educational institutions 
have created special programs to encourage the 
enrollment of older citizens in undergraduate 
programs. Indeed, older students comprise the 
most rapidly increasing segment of the college 
population. 
The largest rate of increase in college 
enrollments have occured among persons 
who are above the traditional age for 
college attendance. The numbers of 
persons enrolled in college rose between 
1970 and 1976 by 80 percent for those 
persons 25 to 29 years old and by 
96 percent for those 30 to 34 years 
old. This compares with a rise of 
about 32 percent for those in their 
early twenties and 13 percent for 
persons 18 and 19 years old. The 
number of college students 35 years old 
and over rose by 406,000, or 52 percent; 
between 1972 (when enrollment data for this 
age group were collected) and 1976. Thus, 
in 1976 one-fourth of all college students 
were 25 years old and over, with a majority 
of these students attending college part-
time. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
#307, April 1977 at 20. 
This trend reflects a general re-orientation 
of American society toward opening up new life and 
career options in mid-life: 
The return to school of many adults in the 
middle years is a dramatic manifestation 
of the changing structure and quality of 
these years. Middle age is no longer 
necessarily a period of hopes abandoned 
and reconciliation prior to entering old 
age. It has become a period of new options 
that can provide an increasing number of 
men and women with new opportunities for 
developing new sources of satisfaction and 
meaning. 
-20-
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Dale L. Heistand, Changing Careers After 35: New 
Horizons Through Professional and Graduate Stuay-
(1971) at xii. 
But decisions determining the admission of 
students to degree programs in higher education 
impose barriers against older students. Decisions 
to deny older students admission to these programs 
are far too common. Unlike admission processes affecti 
undergraduate programs, which are often based upon 
routinized, objective standards, the graduate 
admission process is decentralized, and, as is clear 
from the case at bar, not subject to uniform standards. 
Selection of standards varies not merely from 
institution to institution, but from department 
:.c department within a university. Id. at 57. These 
arbitrary, standardless processes create a barrier to 
the vindication of equal protection rights by older 
citizens. 
The most significant barrier is the discriminator: 
attitude held by department chairmen and other universi: 
officials involved in the admissions process. Perhaps 
the argument that is most essential to discriminatory 
decisions is the "investment notion": graduate 
education is viewed as an investment in a student's 
potential earnings capacity, or as defendants' brief 
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puts it, they wish "to maximize the benefits to 
the state." (at 17) Such an investment in an 
older student is believed to yield fewer dividends 
in the market place. Assuming arguendo that there 
is a foundation to the "investment notion," it is 
surely impermissible for an institution of higher 
education to qualify a citizen's equal protection 
right based upon a factor that in no way relates to 
academic qualifications. Since women, Blacks, 
and Chicanos may be correctly predicted to have less 
earnings potential than white males, the same 
construct would justify arbitrary decisions to 
limit their access to higher education. 
Interviews with approximately 60 university 
officials including presidents, deans, admissions 
directors, and department chairpersons, by Columbia 
University's Conservation of Human Resources 
Project reveals much about the barriers confronting 
older students seeking admission to graduate programs. 
Individuals involved in admissions review claim that 
it is difficult to assess an older student's 
academic background. Admission officials may 
limit entry to a graduate program to older students, 
especially those over 50, only if they are "very 
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superior." "Older applicants tend to be 'guilty 
unless proven innocent' of a variety of short-
comings." Some faculty members believe that older 
students are "unrealistic" in their reasons for 
wanting to attend graduate school; they appear to 
believe that older students want the prestige 
of graduate studies! Heistand, supra. at 63-65. 
Older applicants do not appear to be judged 
by a clear, precise admissions criteria. "Each 
person involved in the admissions process tends to 
impose his own perhaps idiosyncratic standards." 
Id. at 56. 
The preble~ of age discrimination in college 
admlssions is not unlike other forms of age-based 
discrimination; an older person is too often judged 
not on his/her ability to do a particular task 
but on the prevailing notion that increasing age 
means decreasing capability. "The inexorable 
passage of time is deemed prima facie evidence of 
incompetence .... " Note, "Too Old to Work; The 
Constitutionality of Mandatory Retirement Plans," 
44 So. Cal. L. Rev. 150, 179, (1971). 
The use of an age-based criterion in a 
graduate program by its nature relates directly 
to occupational opportunities and salary levels. 
-23-
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Given the institutional commitment of the State of 
Utah and the federal government to the employment 
of workers at least until the age of 65, 7 the use 
of an age-based criterion in a graduate program is 
antagonistic to current public policy. 
In point of fact, the discriminatory admissions 
policy, far from being a reasonable means to accomplish 
a legitimate governmental end, actually visits 
an economic, employment-related penalty upon those 
very citizens protected by laws forbidding age-based 
employment discrimination. According to available 
findings, the presence of a masters degree can make 
a difference of as much as 48% in earnings in the non-
S 
educational field. 
7 The federal Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §621, et seq., which applies to both 
public and private employers, 29 U.S.C. §§630, 633a, 
and its Utah counterpart, 4B Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-6 
and 34-35-3(5), prohibit age-based employment dis-
crimination against persons between the ages of 40 
and 65. Both the House and the Senate are considering 
legislation which would liberalize the federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, and it is likely 
that soon the protect1ons of the Act will extend to 
employees of state governments and those in private 
industry at least through the age of 70. Congress-
man Claude Pepper has authored H.R. 5383, which would 
have that effect, and on September 27, 1977, it passed 
the house by a 359 to 4 vote. 
8 Table I shows the average monthly starting 
salarv for recent graduates in four selected fields 
and Table II shows both beginning salaries for public 
school teachers and average salaries of public school 
teachers as affected by the presence or absence of a 
post-graduate degree. 
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I 
N 
lfl 
I 
Average Monthly Starting Salary For Pecent Graduates 
FIELD 
Engineering 
Accounting 
Other Technical Fields* 
Business Admin. Fields 
1977 
Average Monthly Average Monthly 
Starting Salary Starting Salary 
w/B.A. w;'r-1.A. 
$1,242.00 
1,067.00 
1,076.00 
932.00 
$1,430.00 
1,267.00 
1,315.00 
** 1,476.00 
*** 1,385.00 
* Chemistry Math/Statistics 
** Techinical Undergraduate Degree 
*** Non-Technical Undergraduate Degree 
Source: Frank S. Endicott, The Endicott P.eport (1976), 
TABLES 4, 5 
Difference 
Monthly 
$188.00 
200.00 
239.00 
544.00 
453.00 
Difference 
Yearly 
$2,256.08 
2,400.00 
2,868.00 
6,528.00 
5,436.00 
Percentage 
Difference 
15% 
18 
22 
58 
48 
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TABLE THO 
Beginning Salaries for Public School Teachers 
Bachelor's Degree 
l1aster 's Degree 
Ph.D. 
1975-76 
Salary 
8,768.00-......._ 
9,979.oo./' 
11,413.00 
Percentage 
Difference 
12% ~30"' >ly 0 
Average Salaries of Public School Teachers 
1975-76 
Per::::entage 
Salary Difference 
Bachelor's Degree or less 10,976.00 
Master's Degree or higher 13,702.00 25% 
Source: National Education Association, "Status of 
the American Public School Teacher, 1975-76, •· (in 
pre£s, 1977). 
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Thus, the admissions criterion goes beyond 
mere disparate treatment among identically situated 
individuals, which alone is a denial of equal 
protection, and perpetuates a form of discrimination 
now condemned by current public policy. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
By no stretch of the imagination can the 
decision of the lower court stand. While the 
defe11dants have a legitimate interest in allocating 
scarce resources consistently with proper educational 
objectives, the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that identically situated 
residents of the State of Utah be treated equally. 
If the classification pursuant to which the plaintiff 
was excluded is tested by the rational basis 
test, it is a matter of pure conjecture on the present 
record what rational basis the defendants are relying 
upon. The stipulated facts are that plaintiff was 
denied admission to the defendants' post-graduate 
3 The American Federation of Teachers, AFL-
CIO, "Survey of Teachers' Salaries, 1975-76," cite 
somewhat higher salary statistics illustrating an 
even greater salary difference between the two 
degrees. The mean salary for a classroom teacher 
with a Bachelor'3 Degree and one with a Master's 
Degree is computed at $14,804.00 and $17,130.00 
respectively--a difference of $2,325.00 annually . 
.l'unerican Federation of Teachers ''cFL-CIO, "Survey 
of Teachers' Salaries 197 5-7G," \'lashing ton, D. C. 
Hay 1977. 
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program solely because of her age, and while the 
plaintiff's age is alleged in the complaint, the 
record does not elucidate the specific details of 
the defendants' exclusionary policy or the mechanices 
of its implementation. It is utterly impossible 
to evaluate the legal signific~ance of the exclusionary 
policy under the Fourteenth Amendment without further 
factual exposition. 
Moreover, even if some form of age-based 
exclusionary policy could be shown to satisfy the 
relevant constitutional standards, there is no way 
the policy in the instant case could measure up; 
it vests in the defendants the unfettered discretion, 
unguided by any objective standards, to make arbitrary 
judgments, to the demonstrable economic detriment 
of those who are rejected. 
Therefore, it is respectfully urged that the 
decision of the lower court be reversed and that the 
Court rule as a matter of law that there is no constitu-
t~onally sufficient justification for the age-based 
classification in question, remanding the cause for a 
full trial. 
DATED this 
Of Counsel: 
Alfred Hiller 
Robert B. Gillan 
{0 -rj,_day of +&~t~:__----"---'---' 19 77. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Amici Curiae to 
Brian Barnard, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 214 East 
Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah and Brinton R. Burbidge, 
Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, 
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v. 
CY2US R. Vi~UCP., 
Secretary of State, 
ET J\L., 
Defendants. 
Civil Action No. 76-0085 
- i 
:-ILE;:J 
JAi,:ES F. D.'.VEY, C!erk 
Before ROBB, Circuit Judqe, GESELL, District Jud~~, 
and FLAN~JERY,Dist=ict Judqe. 
NEt'-10~2\:,JDU~t 
This case presents the question whethe= statu~orily 
requirad retirement at age sixty for those persons covered 
by the Foreign Service Retirenent System (''Foreign Service 
personnel") violates the equal protection guarant~es e:!lbodied 
in the Fifth .'<mendrnent. Y Pl2intiffs are Foreign Service 
Officers who were or will be forced into ret1re~en~ at age 
si~ty and an organizat1on whose rne~bersh1~ inclu~2s such 
officers. They seek declaratory and i~junctlve re!:ef. This 
2/ 
matter comes before the Court on defendants' motion to disrr.iss-' 
or for Su..Tlunar-y judgment and plaintiffs' opposition t!"lere'to. At 
oral argu.;;Jent plaintif:: cross-moved for SUfi\..':l.ary judglilent, but 
indicated th~t defend2nts could not prevail withou't supple~en~i~; 
the record. Defendants indicated a willingness for the c~se to 
.!_/ Plaintiffs originally had other claims Hhich \.Jere presented 
to a single Distric't Judge. The first, a contention that the 
mandato~y ret1rement ~gc viol~ted the Aqe Discrimin3~lon in 
Emolo~~ent Act, 22 U.S.C. § 633a, Executive Order 11141,3 C.f.g. 
§ 179: and C1vil ServJ..ce requlu.tions, \.;as dismisse:::. on de.:12r:de;:1-:s' 
mot1or.. 418 F. Su:Jp. 64 (l97G). A related cla1r:t ·.:3s dis:ni~s~'i 
by Court Order on July ~7. 1976, and a claim o~ d~scr~mina~10~ 
in the appllc~t~on of the ret1rcrnen~ age was d~sm1ssea by 
St1pulat1on of counsel on October 14, 1976. 
2/ Defend~~~s initiall~· arqucd that the F ~th Ame~~~ent docs ~o-: 
'il~pl:-· ~o:::~L:::'O:' f'l.Jl~':i ~ls he:.~·(' r:o prO?C'rty n~crcst ar.:i bec:w~~ 
th'C:'~' =;l'l:l0t c:-rZ!ll~nsr· c-r pnrtlOrr o: a ::--.tctu c undc-:- • ... -:~ich t.h~y 
h..J'.rc :-c=c>:..v.-·n s~:.b.so:.:n:.12.l bene:lt..5. Th~se contcnciCJ;".::: have r.c 
m -~ 1 .:. :. 
Appendix 
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b..:! dcc.ld~.o.'d on tilC' c>:i..:.t.l.IICJ !:" 1_·cunl. F0lluh·1r:g ordl Jrr_;u11'!n~ 
the p.1 rtlL:S \:ere g1vc:n an OfJflOrtunity to sutr:1it ,-JrjcJlt.l0nu.l 
evidence, and both s1Jc!. J1d so. 
Section 632 of thL For~.lgn Service: Ac~ o~ 1g~6, 
as .:~mended, 22 U.S.C. § 1002, ~~undutc:; rct.:.rc::1c.:-nt <lt .Jge 
St~tcs Inforn~t1on Agency (''USIA''), and the Agency £or 
International Development (''AID'') .1/ Generally, e~ployees o£ 
the Federctl Government need not retire at such an early age. 
Those employees covered by the Civil Service ("Civil Service 
personnel'') do not face mandatory retirement until age seventy. 
5 U.S.C. § 8335. Plaintiffs claim that Congress has drawn an 
unla~·Jfu.l dis tinction by set.ting a lower retirement age for 
4/ 
Foreign Ser"lCe personnel than for Civil Serv1ce personnel.-
Since neither ''fundamental'' rights. nor ''suspect'' classes are 
involved here, the distinction betvleen Civil Service and Foreign 
Service employees is prop2r if there is a rational basis to 
suppo=~ it. San Antonio Ind. School Oist. v. Rodriouez, 411 
U.S. l (1973); Nass. Bd. of Retirement v. Hurgia, 427 U.S. 307 
(1976). Thus the si~ple issue presented here is whether the 
conditions of Foreign Service work are sufficiently different 
Y Any "participant" in the Foreign Service Retirenent and. 
Disability System, who is not a career ambassador or a chie£ 
of mission, must retire at age sixt~' unless the Secretary 
makes a special deter~ina~ion to '~aive retirement for f1ve 
years. See 22 U.S.C. § 1002. Those "part.icipants" are: 
{1) Foreign Service Officers; (2} Foreign Service Rese=ve 
Officers with unlimited tenure (whether serv1ng in State 
Department or USIA); (3) Fore1gn Service Informat1on Officers; 
(4) Foreign Service Staff officers and employees with unlimited 
appointments (whether serving 1n State Department or USIA) ; an~ 
{5) Personnel serving in AID who have unlim1ted Fore1qn Service 
Reserve or Staff appo1nL~ents or who are serving under 
Presidential appointment and meet certa1n other qualificatio~s. 
~/ This claim raises an issue about the laufulness of forced 
retirc~ent between the ages of s1xtv and seventy, i.e., the 
difference between the C1v1l Servic~ and the Forei~n-Service. 
Pl~intiffs also claim sect1on 632 discrimin~tes bct:;een those 
who have redchcd ~ge sixt~· and those who are younge~. This 
second cl~im r31Se$ ~n add1t1on~l 1ssue about tnc lawfulness 
of forc~d rct1~0~en~ ~t 2ne st·vc~t·.· ~nd ~b~ve. Defendants h~V~ 
gfy~~;:;~ (j~g~~i~:tP~~~~~~:~,,~;,:i ;~~:~;;~~:~,s ~; ~g~g ~ ~: rc 
£.1:-~. ':'hu~ (: .. ~·~·:lrl~n:::,... r1.r't" C'l:.::.>.:_~,~.J t':l ~.:... . .....__"'l,Jry JlL.L;~e:lt as to 
the: :.~·cowl cl.:~ t-:. 
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frc;1 Ll1l:' c::nd~tl.o;--,:..; Cl: C.lvi.l Serv1c1..~ \.Jorh. :..;o th<J.t thl.! b..JTl.l£!,: 
rctirc;:-:cnl .Jge lS rutlOnJl. ~- l·lu~-c;Iu, suorZJ ut n. 8. The: 
ZJ0Plic.Jtion of the ''rational basis stundard'' does not require, 
thougl1, JUdlci.Jl abdic~tion. It simply nc3~= tt1at the 
l~gislatively drawn dtstinct1on is presumptively valid, and 
that its challengers have a heavy burd~n iil provi~g its 
invalldity. On the record cs~ablishcd in this case, the 
early mandatory retirement age for Foreign Service personnel 
cannot survive even this most ninimal scrutiny. 
The Government presents two explanations £or the 
retirement age distinction. It first says that the mandatory 
retirer:-.ent age is rationally related to its interest in 
creating udvancement opportunities for younger people. 
However, an interest in recruiting and promoting younger 
people solely because of their youth is inherently 
discriminatory and cannot provide a legitimate basis for the 
statutory scheme. Furthermore~ there is no obvious reason why 
such a rationale \Vould not equally applr -::o the Civil Service 1 
and defendants have presented none. 
The second rationale is that Fore~s~ Ser~lce 
personnel~ unlike Civil Service personnel, tend to work 
overseas and they face, therefore, unusual physical and 
psychological dif~iculties. Sixty year olds are said not to 
have the vitality necessary to carry out overseas assigr.rr.ents, 
particularly in ''hardship posts,"due to the inhere~t effects 
of ageing and the cumulative effects of a career spent in 
foreign lands. Furthermore, the Government contends that 
upon reaching age si::-:ty people are more likely to need medical 
atten~ion, which is often lacking in fore~gn posts. 
The record compiled in this case conclusively 
est2blishes that Civil Service and other Government person~el 
work overseas in positions and locations com?arable to those 
o! Forciq~ Serv1cc personn~l, ~ithout facing forced rctirc~ent 
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worl:lrHJ for tile Government. uvC?rsc:Js. t1orc: than 38,000 ·v:e~~ 
st.::tt1.oned in foreign countr1.es, und .J.bot..:t 20,000 were 1.n tne 
Un1.ted States Trust Terrl.lOrlcS (~-~-' Panama, Sarno~. Wake 
Island))/ Only 4, 737 of these Government e01;:>loyees fuccd 
mandatory retirement at ~ge sixty. Thus, less than ten percent 
of the American civilians who work overseas for the Govern~ent 
are forced to retire at age sixty.~ 
Not only are there substantial numbers of Americans 
working abroad not subject to early retirement; many of these 
people have jobs similar to those of Foreign Service personnel. 
The Foreign Service organizations(State Depar~ent, USIA, AID) 
had 7,792 American civilian employees working abroad in 
November, 1976. Ho\.;ever, many of these employees have Civil 
Service status and the right to v1ork until age seventy. In 
fact, almost forty percent of the Americans \·Jho work overseas 
for the Foreign Service agencies are subject to Civil Se=vice 
retirement. In addition, AID often has its work performed on 
a contr.Jct: basis by employees of other departments or agencies 
such as the Depart~ent of Agriculture and the Corps of 
Engineers. These e~ployees, of course, may work until seventy. 
AID also contracts with private United States organizations to 
carry out much of its actual technical work. Employees of 
these organizations are not required to retire at age sixty 
and quite co~~only serve above that age. Nor is it true that 
Foreign Service personnel are unique i~ having to handle 
assignments to unusually difficult posts or "hardship" posts. 
5/ The Government has contended that it is the diffic:ultv of 
living and working abroad that makes Foreign Service work-
distinctive. Any such difflculty should be equ~lly prcs2nt in 
the Tru.;t Territories which, like forelgn countries, may be 
considered "hardship posts" fo::- Governmen~ em?loyees. See 5 
U.S.C. § 5941. Thus, it seems approprlate for comparison 
purposes to consider employe~s worklng ln Trust Territories in 
the same category as those working in foreign count=ics. 
§/ It those people worl.1ng ~r. Trust Terr1tor1cs arc c':cluded 
rrom the: calc•JLJtlon, th-:: pc.rce:1::ua~ of tn':l~' fac1nq carl: 
retlre~en~ only r~s~s to uhou~ twelve and one-half pc::-cent. 
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~t~tluned ~lrro~t exclus1vely in undurdcv0lopcd areas of the 
world. FLI~the=more, unlike Fure1gn Service pcrsonn2l, t!1ey 
often lrJc among the poorE::st SE:}r.J.ents of thr~ local PD?lll:Jcr..! 
~nd face an}' adverse condit1ons tl1at reny ex1st. Thes~ 
assignments ~re obviously as taxing and strenuous as Foreign 
Service assignnents. Yet, there is no upper age limit at all 
for Peace Corps volunteers. Affidavits indicate that many 
Peace Corps volunteers are, in fact, over nge sixty, and that 
there has been no noticeable pro8lem vri th medical services. 
Finally, it is clear that Civil Service personnel also \Vork 
7/ 
in ''hardship posts''.- Thus plaintiffs have convincingly 
shown that reaching age sixty is itself no bar to Govern~ent 
employment overseas. The vast majority of American~ working 
abroad for the Government do not face early retirer.-oe;"lt, 
although their work may be similar in all relevant =cspccts 
to that perfor~ed by Foreign Service personnel. 
There remains, though, ~,e Government c~~tention 
that Foreign Service personnel are unique in that ~he~· s?en~ 
significant portions of their careers abroad, und that this 
has a cu:nulative ii7l,?act so that by age si:-:ty they are generally 
incapable of effective service. In essence the Gove~r.ment says 
that while non-Foreign Service personnel serve abroaC, they do 
not follow careers overseas. Plaintiffs, through discovery, 
attempted to compile a statistical comparison of time spent 
abroad by Foreign Service personnel and by other Gover~~e;"lt 
employees. Defendants uere unable to provide this data 
because of the nature of their recordkeeping systems. Thus 
plu1ntiffs h~ve sub~itted the first ten pages of the State 
8/ 
Department's Bioqraohic Renistcr- for June, 1974 (t~e last 
7/ 7he record does not allow a comparison betv:cen the nu..-:-:ber 
~f Civil s~rv1ce und Forc1gn Serv1cc personnel serving in 
''n2r~~hl? ~o~ts." 
R.' ''~he o: 0.-~,~hic P=c1~t0~ p~ovides conc1se bio~ra?h c 
l~'f.CJr:-n._,r·(·~-0~:;-:,-..-.-::s8~.:~0l-----o?" D::'.-:rt:n~nt o: s::ate Jnd n llc·r 
FhLrul ,_,:'·rt'.:"~.:.'n'~- <rr,-.:·ncu=s in ":..he :1c-ld of foreiCJ-:1 :'! :,j:._rs." 
!~!C' 11·1~ t( .. -. :_!.S:..:.:. ,l:..:.ly, 19"7;_, !'· II. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-(,-
d.:..s.t~ for \VhlC!i 1t is cJVJ.Llo:Olc) <Jnd CJ.rl uttd:"lic.:d o:-::pl.:.::-~uto:-;· 
exhibit.. Of the' t\venty-f.:..vc ForclQ:l Scr"JlC:! O:f.::.ccr~ 11:-J'.:.',·j 
in thC'se ten p.Jge!s \vho v1ere over o.c _ _F::! : ifty, the uvc-r21g'= 
length of time spent overseas wa~ fifteen y~<..~rs 2nd the 
averuge length of time spent in the Service 1n the Un1tcd 
States was ten years. As a comparison plaintlffs have also 
submitted pages from the Biograph1c Register containing the 
names of thirteen Civil Service employees o£ the Agriculture 
Departr.l.ent 1 s Foreign Service who are over age fifty and an 
attached explanatory exhibit. The average length of time 
spent overseas by these Civil Service employees \Vas 11.2 
years and 2n average of eight years was spent in the Service 
in the t1ni ted St::J.tes. The Court does not find this 
difference in time spent overseas significant. Several other 
exhibits also indicate that there are many Americans in the 
Civil Service pursuing careers overseas in the same way that 
Foreign Service personnel do. 
The Government has made no attempt to counter the 
above showing. It merely maintains that since at any given 
time a far hisher proportion of Foreign Service personnel are 
serving overseas than are Civil Service personnel, the system 
is rational. It is, of course, true that a statute is not 
unlawful merely because it creates an imperfec~ classification. 
Dandridae v. l-li11ia.'11s, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). If only a 
small number of personnel working overseas escaped the 
sixty-year age limit, the Government • s point would be \vell 
taken. However, we are faced with a situation where tens of 
thousands of Americans are working for the United States 
Government overseas and only a tiny percentage are singled 
out for early retirement. Yet this small group does not 
appear to serve under any more difficult conditions than the 
others, nor do they seem to serve for a significantly longer 
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per~oJ o! t1~~- Th1~ s~·stcn1 1~ patent!)' ~rb1tr~ry un~ 
irr.l.tlon.1l.2/ Tnus pluint1ff::;' l7lOtlon for sufiUTlary Jud:;ment 
GJ2 of the Fore1gn Service hct is hereby declared 
unconst1tutio~al and void. Participants in the Foreign 
Service retirc~ent and disability system cannot be ~ubject 
to automatic retirement until age seventy. Of course,Conqrcss 
is not foreclosed from redraHir.g the statutory scher.~~ to 
eliminate ~,e arbit=ary classifications now existing and 
im?osing any rational mandatory retirement age. This decision 
does not affect those pLovisions of the Foreign Service Act 
which set forth retirement benefits o= alternative means of 
retirel7le>lt, Hhether voluntary or involuntary. 
The claims of the individual plaintiffs £or back 
pay and reins~atemen~ must be reviewed. Counsel are directeC 
to confer in light of this opini~n and submit an app~opriate 
form of order within t'l.-10 weeks resolving the claims for back 
pay and reinstate~ent. 
Each pRr~y shall bear its own costs anci fees. 
United States Circu~t Judge 
United States District Judge 
0--ft..(_:-v-"-'~- 0-'~~'-' 
UniteG States Dlstr~ct Jud~c 
June 28, 1977. 
2_/ The coverr:n1ent 1 s contention that it need not make everyone 
1n th~ c~v1l sc~v1.ce ret1re at age sixty because of those . 
rt;:la"'::.l.vcly fe.·J civ1l servants \lho serve abroud is non secr:..J.!.tU!'. 
The lS:3ue 1s \·.'~H~'thc::- the mandatO!"j' ret1.rcm::nt c:u;w ir.:;;oscC on 
For21gn Su~vi=~ ~~=~o~ncl c~n be d2omed ration~! in ll~~t o£ 
t:-J~ Sl'.::uu~ion ~: o:-_hcr .. -.m,:..r!c.:ms \..;ho are \·.·ork1ng abroac.. 
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